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NATURE OF CASE
This

is

a

review

of

the

District

Court's

ruling

on

defendant's order to show cause that no trust had been created by
the parties or in the alternative that in the event on appeal a
trust was found to have been created, said trust is terminated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 1973, the parties to a divorce proceeding
entered
where

into

a

property

settlement

agreement

and

stipulation

in ,r10 they agreed that income derived from the

interest

held by the parties in a real estate syndicate should be established as a family trust known as the Sunquist Family Trust Fund
with

the

plaintiff

and

defendant

as

trustees

and

with
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the

restriction and

requirement

that

said

funds be accumulated

for

the education of the minor children of the parties at such time
as the children had received or terminated their advanced education,

any sums

remaining

in said

trust

fund

should be equally

divided between the plaintiff and defendant (Record, p. 40, 41).
The parties'

agreement was incorporated into

,f ( j)

of Divorce signed by the court on October 24,
49, 50).

of the Decree

1973

(Record, p.

A savings account was set up with the defendant's con-

sent, the purpose of the account was to provide funds to educate
the children (Record, p. 108-7, 108-24).
The

parties

returned

to

court

on

April

27,

1976

on

plaintiff's order to show cause and entered into a written stipulation wherein the defendant agreed to remove herself as a joint
signatory from

the account and

that

the plaintiff would be the

sole signator for the account from which funds were withdrawn for
the

educational

pursuits

of

the

children

(Record,

p.

56,

57).

The stipulation of the parties was ratified by an order by the
court acknowledging the existence of the fund and the use of the
fund for the education of the parties' minor children (Record, p.
60-62).

The court

then

entered

an

amended order which stated

"the trust fund shall continue to contribute to the educational
costs of the children so long as proper evidence of costs related
to the higher education of the children are provided" {Record, p.
66).
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The defendant filed an order to show cause as to why the
trust fund created for the education of the minor children of the
parties

should

not

equally between

be

terminated

plaintiff

and

and

the

defendant

proceeds

{Record,

distributed

p.

73).

The

defendant, in her affidavit filed in support of the order to show
cause,

states,

"the purpose of the

trust,

to educate the minor

children of the parties, has now been accomplished and the assets
of the

trust

equally"

should

be distributed

{Record, p.

68).

hearing on October 16,
dant

in

because

argument
of

February 8,
tinually

friction
1980,

The order to show cause came on for

~979

stated

and at that time counsel for defen-

that

(Record,

the
p.

the defendant,

acknowledged

the

to plaintiff ·and defendant

trust

71) •

should
At

the

be

eliminated

trial

heard

throughout her testimony,

existence

of

a

trust

and

remedy sought by her was that the trust be terminated.

the

on

cononly

The main

reason for its termination she stated was because of the friction
between the parties

(Record, p.

presented no evidence
did not
18).

intend

108-15, 108-18).

The defendant

to show that the parties'

three children

to go on with their education

The defendant further admitted

entered

into an addendum to the

{Record,

p.

108-

in her testimony that she

trust agreement on January 25,

1975 which. addendum stated that the completion of the trust would
be when all the beneficiaries have completed their higher education

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit

"C").

Plaintiff's

testimony

at

the
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trial

was

that

the

trust

was

set

up

for

an

indefinite

period

until the parties' children had received their education and that
at the time of the hearing, the children were taking courses in
higher education (Record, p. 108-28, 108-29, 108-30, 108-34).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks an order of

the court directing a

reversal of the trial court's order and reins ti tu ting the trust
fund with the funds

previously divided between the parties and

the awarding of attorney's fees

for plaintiff's defense of the

trust or in the alternative, an order remanding the matter to the
trial court so that the issue of whether or not the trust exists
can be properly heard with notice to the parties.
ARGUMENT
I.

A TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE PARTIES
PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF THE COURT
In order to create a trust, certain requirements exist.
Those requirements include a competent settler and a trustee, an
ascertainable trust res, and sufficiently certain beneficiaries,
76

Arn.

Jur.2d Trusts

§31.

been met in the instant case.

All of

the above requirements have

The settlers, being the parties in

this case have clearly manifested their intent in no fewer than
eight (8) written documents and have themselves indicated that a
trust exists for the education of their children.

Both plaintiff
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and

defendant,

in

their

complaint

and

answer

and

counterclaim

respectively indicated that they wished a trust fund to be established for the education of the children (Record, p. 2, 6). These
intentions
which was

were

formalized

subsequently

in

a

property

incorporated

settlement

agreement

into the Decree of Divorce

(Record, p. 40, 41, and 49). Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce,
the parties in fact created a savings account with the proceeds
of the

fund,

the purpose of the savings account was to provide

proceeds to educate the children (Record, p. 108-24).
The parties themselves acted as trustees and in fact the
plaintiff went
(Record I p. 54)

to
e

court

to

remove

the

defendant

as

a

trustee

As a result, the parties entered into a stipu-

lation which acknowledged that the plaintiff was· to be the sole
signator on the savings account from which the trust funds would
be withdrawn (Record, p. 56, 57).
62)

and an amended order

An order (Record, p.

(Record, p.

64,

65,

66)

60, 61,

embodying the

language of the stipulation and ratifying the same was entered by
the

court

acknowledging

the

savings

account

in

fact

held

the

trust fund and further acknowledging that the fund was to be used
for the education of the parties' children.
Thus,

there can be no doubt that the beneficiaries of

the trust as named were the parties' children, and that a savings
account held the funds which would be used to educate the children.

Therefore,

the

requirements of a

trust were

fulfilled,
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acted and relied upon by the parties and the court itself.
Loco Credit Union vs. Reed, 516 P.2d 1112, (New Mexico,
1973)

relates

issue.

The

a

fact

parties

situation

quite

similar

to

the

case

in obtaining a divorce had entered

at

into a

written property settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed
that a sum of money on deposit with a credit union (Loco) be held
in trust by the plaintiff for the expenses of the college education of the children of the parties and as much of the sum that
would not be used for the college education of the son should be
used . for

the expense of the college education of the daughter.

The stipulation was incorporated into the Decree of Divorce and
subsequent to that time, the credit union attacked the fact that
a trust had been created and was
Supreme Court,

following

in existence.

The New Mexico

basic trust law found

that a trust in

fact existed and set forth the following ruling:
There was no provision in the written instrument evidencing the creation of the trust reserving unto the
settlers the power to revoke the trust.
Therefore, the
trust was irrevocable.
4 Scott on Trusts, §330 .1 (3rd
Ed., 1967) and cases cited therein holding in accord.
The rights ano duties of the trustee not detailed in the
trust instrument are sufficiently detailed in the law of
trusts.
No claim has been made by either of the settlers, who are the only ones who have served as trustees, or by the beneficiaries, or anyone on their behalf,
that there has been any question as to the rights and
duties of the trustee, except as to the extent above
indicated.
The use to be made of the trust property is
clearly stated in the written instrument evidencing the
creation of the trust.
Minute details, as to the precise items for which funds in an educational trust must
be used, are not necessary for the trust's validity.
In
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fact,. a detailed limitation upon the expenditures to be
made for precisely anticipated i terns would be far more
likely to defeat· the beneficial purposes of an educational trust than would the general provision that the
trust funds are to be used for the college education of
the beneficiary.
Since the written instrument evidencing the trust's
creation fails to show an agreement as to the date of
the termination of the trust, it will continue until the
trust purposes have been accomplished.
The time of the
ending of the trust need not appear in the writing.
Bogert, Trust & Trustees, Supra, §87 at 489.
The trial court,

therefore, had no basis either in law

or in fact to support a finding that a trust did not exist.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
TERMS OF THE TRUST WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THAT THE
PURPOSES OF THE TRUST HAVE BEEN FULFILLED.
The testimony presented at the hearing in the matter by
the defendant clearly indicated that the purpose of the trust had

not been fulfilled.
tiff's counsel,

In response to a direct question by plain-

"do you have any statements or

~vidence

to show

the court that any of the three children do not intend to go on
with their education?"

The defendant responded, "no,

I

don't."

In response to counsel's furthe-r questioning, "and, in fact, Joel

and Alyce have
wish

to

further

indicated to you,

th~t

their education?

they have not,

Answer:

Yes."

that they

(Record,

p.

108-18) •
The

statements

submitted

at

trial

by

the

children

(Plaintiff's
Exhibit
"A"Library.
and
Defendant's
2 Services
and 3)
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney Law
Funding"B",
for digitization
provided by the Institute Exhibit
of Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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show that in fact both Alyce and Joel intend to continue on with
their

The

education.

children

remain

statements

impartial

submitted

regarding

a

indicate

decision

that

the

regarding

the

trust and only Matt Sunguist affirmatively agreed that the trust
should

be

terminated

(Defendant's

Exhibit

1).

In

Clayton

v.

Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah, 1977} this court stated "a trust may
be terminated where its continuance is not necessary to carry out
a

material

purpose

of

the

trust

where

all

the

beneficiaries

thereof consent, and where none of them are under any incapacity;
and where the settler is the sole beneficiary, by the weight of
authority he can terminate the trust at any time and compel the
trustee
though

to

reconvey

the

the

purposes

of

plished."

property
the

(Emphasis added. }

trust

to

him.

have

not

Th is

is

been

fully

In the present case,

true

even

accom-

not all the

beneficiaries have consented to the termination of the trust nor
did

the set tlors reserve any right to terminate the trust.

As

previously stated in the Loco case, Supra and stated in Clayton:
"The rule of law as stated in Scott's Abridgment of the Law of
Trusts, 1960 Ed. at page 607 as follows:
Where a trust is created inter vivas, the question often
arises whether the settler can revoke the trust. Whereby
the terms of the trust he has reserved a power of revocation, he can revoke the trust in the manner in which
and to the extent to which he has reserved such a power.
On the other hand, if he has not reserved a power of
revocation, he cannot revoke the trust.
The evidence clearly indicates that the purpose of the trust has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not been accomplished,

and

the beneficiaries have not all con-

sented to the termination of the trust.

Therefore the purposes

of the trust have not been fulfilled.
III.
PLAINTIFF WAS PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S RULING
SUA SPONTE THAT A TRUST DID NOT EXIST SINCE
SUCH ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED OR TRIED TO THE COURT.
The ruling by the

trial court sua sponte that a trust

did not exist was prejudicial to the plaintiff in that plaintiff

had no opportunity

t~

rebutte by evidence or testimony any of the

contentions the trial court had regarding the validity or ex istence

of

the

trust.

Defendant's

order

to

show

cause

simply

states in part:
Then and there to show cause if any you have why the
decree is amended herein, which required that a trust
fund be created for the education of the minor children
of the parties, should not be terminated and the proceeds distributed equally between plaintiff and defendant.
(Record, p. 73)
At the time of the original order to show cause hearing,
the thrust of counsel for defendant's argument is set forth
~e

in

minute entry "counsel for defendant responds stating that the

trust

should

be

71.)

During

the

hearing on the matter,

never

raised

the

issue

existence and

eliminated because of

as

friction."

(Record,

p.

counsel for defendant

to whether or not

the

trust was

in

in fact throughout the record keeps referring

to

the trust and in closing argument to the court indicated that the
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relief sought by the defendant was termination of the trust, not
the existence of the trust (Record, p. 108-43, 108-44, 108-45).
This court has stated in National Farmers Union Property
&

Casualty Company v.

Thompson,

4 Ut.2d 7,

13,

286 P.2d,

249,

253, "notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities

and

liberalized procedure,

we must

not

lose

sight of

the

cardinal principal that under our system of justice, if an issue
is

to

be

tried

and

a

parties'

rights

concluded

with

respect

thereto, he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet
it."
The defendant, by not raising the issue of the existence
of the trust in her pleadings nor at the hearing and the court
having

ruled

sua

sponte,

severely prejudiced

the

plaintiff

in

that the plaintiff could have been prepared to meet those issues
and present the necessary evidence though testimony and documents
and argument to respond to the issue.

By ruling after the case

was presented and by the court's raising a new issue,

i.e., the

existence of the trust itself, the plaintiff was prejudiced.
IV.
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE PLAINTIFF WAS ACTING
TO DEFEND THE EXISTENCE OF THE TRUST IN
RESISTING DEFENDANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.
The plaintiff was at all times seeking to preserve and
protect

the

trust

from

termination.

The

resultant

legal
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fees

which plaintiff inc·urred were not for his own benefit, but were
in defense of the trust.

76 Am. Jur.2d Trusts, §532 states:

A trustee is entitled to reimbursement or exoneration in
a reasonable amount for fees of counsel properly employed in th~ administration of the estate, for the
costs of litigation and suits against the trust estate
which it is his duty to defend, and for the costs of
suits properly brought in behalf of the estate. (Emphasis added.}
Therefore, if the trust is reinstated, plaintiff should
be reimbursed

for

his

legal

fees

and

costs

of

court

incurred

herein.
CONCLUSION
The

evidence

and

testimony

presented

at

the

time

of

hearing clearly indicates that the trial court erred in its findings that a trust was not created and that the terms of ·the trust
~re

ambiguous and that the purposes of the trust have been ful-

filled.

The evidence at· the hearing clearly indicates that two

of the parties' children were planning to continue on with their
higher education, that an account was set up with the proceeds of
the real property and was being utilized for the sole purpose of
meeting the children's educational financial needs.
THEREFORE,

the

trial court's order should

be reversed

and the trust be reinstated with plaintiff to be reimbursed for
his attorney 1 s

fees

incurred

in defense of the trust.

In the

alternative, should the court find that the evidence contained in
the

record
isby thenot
sufficient
todigitization
establish
the of Museum
existence
of a
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for
provided by the Institute
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,,

-

trust,

then the matter should be remanded to the trial court for

a hearing to determine whether or not a trust is in existence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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